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 Abstract: This paper assesses the origins and the consequences of the decisive right-wing shift 
in Indian politics ushered in by the 2014 elections. Tracing this to long-term but not linearly 
developing tendencies in Indian politics, the paper relates these with the distinctive nature 
and history of capitalist development in India, particularly the sharply polarizing growth and 
accumulation regime of the neo-liberal era and the crisis it now confronts. Asserting that the 
electoral success of the Narendra Modi-led BJP was based on it being the political agent of not 
change but of a reassertion by India’s economic elite, the paper explains the challenge of 
managing sharply contradictory interests that this places in the path of the consolidation of the 
new regime. 
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The immediate context for examining the rise of right-wing conservatism in India is of course 
the resounding victory of the Narendra Modi led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies in 
the 2014 countrywide general elections. The BJP alone crossed the half-way mark in terms of 
parliamentary seats won, and this was the first time in the eight elections after 1984 that any 
single party had managed to achieve this. In other words, unlike what was the case when Atal 
Behari Vajpayee of the BJP was Prime Minister (1998-2004) the survival of the coalition 
government this time is not reliant on support of other political parties who do not necessarily 
adhere to the Hindutva ideology of the BJP1. Narendra Modi, in whose name much of the 
campaign was conducted, was also a leader with an extreme hard-line reputation, somewhat 
in contrast to the image of Vajpayee who was the only other BJP leader to have become Prime 
Minister. Modi in fact was the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat during Vajpayee’s tenure 
as PM. It was under his administration that at least a thousand people and perhaps closer to 
double that number, an overwhelming majority of them Muslims, died in what has been 
described as the Gujarat Genocide of 20022.      
While 2014 does appear to be a crucial turning point in India’s political history insofar as it 
initiated the rule of the most right-wing government India has seen since independence, it 
does so only because of something that appears somewhat paradoxical at first sight. India is 
a country that is said to live in several centuries at the same time – where features of a 
modern economy, polity and society and their corresponding institutions happily co-exist with 
an overwhelming presence of others that are more associated with pre-modern times.  It 
could therefore be considered somewhat surprising that explicitly conservative political 
formations have not dominated the Indian political scene for most of the period since the 
country’s independence from colonial rule in 1947. 
This paper tries to explain the above paradox and in that background, assesses the origins and 
the consequences of the recent decisive right wing shift in Indian politics.     
 
 
                                                          
1 For the BJP’s self-description of its ideology, see: 
http://www.bjp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=369:hindutva-the-great-nationalist-
ideology&Itemid=501    
2 See Brass (2004) for a ‘neutral’ description 
The 2014 Electoral Verdict in Perspective: Looking Beyond the Seats 
India has been a constitutional republic based on universal adult franchise since her 
independence. In having elected governments throughout this period and no phase of 
military dictatorship, she stands out in sharp contrast to many developing countries. Since the 
first general elections in 1952, thirteen rounds of elections have taken place to elect members 
to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament, apart from the elections to the 
numerous state (provincial) legislatures3. If one looks at the voting patterns in Indian 
parliamentary elections over more than six decades (see appendix table), the victory of Modi 
could be seen to reflect both continuity as well as change – in some sense the outcome of a 
gradual but non-linear development of long-term tendencies in Indian politics.  
Voting percentages in Indian general elections clearly tended to increase over the first few 
elections and then tended to stay above the 55 per cent mark from the 1960s. While there 
were fluctuations from election to election, no election before saw the level reached in 2014. 
The sharp spike compared to the previous (2009) election indicated that the Modi victory in 
part was based on the BJP being able to attract some new voters in this election. In contrast 
to this was the fact that among those who voted, the victors in 2014 had the narrowest 
popular support that any elected government has had in all elections. No party or alliance 
with a parliamentary majority in India has ever received 50 per cent of the vote. The closest 
anyone came to that mark was the Indian National Congress in 1984, benefitting from the 
‘sympathy wave’ generated by the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi just before 
the elections. However, at 282 seats with barely 31 per cent of the vote, the Modi-led BJP’s 
victory has depended on the first-past-the-post system more than any previous victor. Even 
the coalitions combined vote share was only 39 per cent. The extent of popular support that 
it got thus tends to get exaggerated when one concentrates only on the number of 
parliamentary seats won.  
While the Indian National Congress (INC), or Congress for short, was the repeated victor in all 
elections till 1977, and has been a ruling party on five occasions afterwards too, there was 
always a substantial non-Congress vote which was dispersed among different political 
formations including regional ones. What could be called conservative political formations 
                                                          
3 As of now the Indian Union has 29 states and seven Union Territories. 
also secured a significant support at the national level on several occasions. The BJP and its 
precursor the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) have been the steady representative of this political 
tendency, though the Swatantra (Freedom) Party also briefly made its mark in the 1960s only 
to fade away thereafter. The support secured by conservative forces achieved a certain 
stability by the end of the 1980s - in terms of the BJP’s support staying around or above a 
floor level close to one-fifth of the vote since the elections in 1991. This emergence of the BJP 
coincided with a decisive and long-term decline in the Congress’ support base.  
The BJP’s steady support in the last two and a half decades, however, did not prevent it too 
from becoming a victim of a trend of governments being repeatedly voted out of power that 
has been a marked feature of this period. While it won in 1998 and 1999, it lost out in 2004 
and fared even worse in 2009. The 2014 result, therefore, reflected to an extent a significant 
revival of the electoral fortunes of the BJP. That it would not suffer a reversal because of the 
continuation of the same trend that helped it win earlier and this time is not something, 
therefore, that can be said with certainty at this point of time. 
One of the features of the BJP’s support base has been its relative geographical concentration, 
having a pattern that has not changed very dramatically over the last two decades. Even in 
2014, the improvement in its electoral performance was most marked in in regions where it 
has traditionally been strong. In other words, it has still not been possible for the BJP to 
replicate the kind of nationwide support that the Congress had earlier managed to secure. 
To summarize what emerges, the decline of the support for the Congress and the rise of the 
BJP have been two interrelated tendencies in Indian politics that had been visible for some 
time. However, the rise of the BJP has not yet resulted in it occupying the kind of stable 
dominant position that the Congress had for so long. Therefore, while there is no doubt that 
victory of Narendra Modi makes the 2014 elections an important landmark in Indian politics, 
it cannot yet be characterized as a seismic change from the long-term patterns and trends in 
this sphere. Given the government it gave rise to, it was a result with a potential for bringing 
about extremely significant long-term changes in Indian politics. However, what would be the 
direction of that change may not yet be a certainty. 
 
 
The Colonial Origins of Indian Capitalism and its Implications 
Capitalism development in India has a distinct history and the political developments that have 
accompanied cannot be quite understood without it. This distinctiveness starts from the very 
origins of Indian capitalism in the second half of the 19th century when India was under colonial 
rule and Britain’s most important colonial asset. Indian society’s unification within a single 
political and administrative structure with a centralized state, and the creation of social classes 
with a ‘national’ character, was itself a consequence of colonialism. But the Indian nation that 
emerged from it, with it’s corresponding ‘national economy’, bore the stamp of its colonial 
history. It was one of the poorest economies of the world in terms of per capita income, 
unequally positioned in the international economic order and was beset with its own internal 
contradictions. 
While colonialism had produced disruptive effects on the economy of the Indian sub-continent 
and squeezed out a surplus from it over a long time, neither colonialism or the limited 
development of capitalist production that it engendered involved a fundamental 
transformation of its social and economic structure. From the standpoint of the development 
of Indian society, colonialism proved to be essentially a conservative force. It introduced 
‘modern’ elements into the economy but its interests were also served by preserving and 
maintaining the pre-existing structures (Ranadive 1979).  
The agrarian economy in particular, to which even at independence three quarters of the 
workforce was tied and which generated more than half the GDP, experienced little 
‘modernization’ over the two centuries of colonial rule.  It remained a peasant agriculture 
where family labour was supplemented by hired labour of landless agricultural workers and 
from which a hierarchy of rentier landed interests extracted a substantial surplus. Small-scale 
cultivation was the norm and the methods and techniques of production remained more or less 
the same as before the advent of colonialism (Patnaik 1999).  
A very limited modern factory emerged and grew from the mid-19th century, its expansion being 
never enough to completely cancel out the destruction that India’s traditional artisanal 
manufacturing experienced over the 19th century because of manufactured imports from 
Britain after the Industrial Revolution. At India’s independence, still dominated by relatively 
technologically unsophisticated light industries, modern manufacturing accounted for only 8 
per cent of the economy’s aggregate output and less than 2 per cent of employment. Even 
the surviving traditional manufacturing sector was larger in size. The development of the 
factory sector, however, did call forth a limited development of the industrial capitalist and 
working classes, the former having both a foreign as well as native components (Ray 1994). The 
limited development was both in a quantitative as well as a qualitative sense – apart from them 
being numerically very small segments of Indian society, each of them was underdeveloped in 
their own ways. The character of the native industrial capitalist class strongly reflected its 
mercantile roots while the working class continued to have strong links with the countryside. 
The sustenance of the institutions of caste and patriarchy was the result of the nature of the 
transformation, or the lack of it, produced by colonialism. British rule to an extent undermined 
the basis and modified the context of the hierarchical division of society into castes, based on 
endogamy and hereditary caste occupation, and its accompanying ideology. So too did the 
social and political movements that grew out of that changing context4. Yet these changes had 
their limitations as typified by the reinforcing or the survival of pre-capitalist relations in 
agriculture, and even the fact that an overwhelming number of Indian capitalists emerged from 
merchant castes or communities. Caste, with the subjugation and oppression of women as its 
accompaniment, continued to play an important role in the social, political, and economic life 
of India in ways that even reinforced them. Capitalist development, instead of decisively 
undermining such institutions, itself came to organize itself in a way where it made use of them.   
If independent India was bequeathed a backward economy and society by colonialism, it also 
came into being as a nation characterized by tremendous religious, linguistic and cultural 
diversity. The partition at independence between India and Pakistan of course changed the 
composition of the population such that those who identified themselves as being adherents 
of a religion, Hinduism, whose origins are in the sub-continent became the overwhelming 
majority (around 80 per cent presently). South Asia, however, had also been the region of the 
world which became home to the largest Islamic population. Even after the partition of India 
in 1947 and then Bangladesh’s separation from Pakistan in 1971 – the three countries of the 
sub-continent follow Indonesia in the list of countries in the world with the largest Muslim 
populations. In India they have always constituted the largest religious minority group, 
                                                          
4 Desai (2002), Ch. 14, pp. 227-245 provides a synoptic view of the various forces contributing to the undermining 
of the caste system. But one can say with the benefit of hindsight that the presumption of a somewhat linear 
trend of its decline was overly exaggerated.  
accounting for 14% of the population presently. There are also other significant minority 
populations following religions that emerged in the sub-continent (e.g. Sikhism, Buddhism, 
Jainism) or came to it from other parts of the world (e.g. Christianity or Zoroastrianism). 
Partition’s impact on the variety of languages and cultures in India was much less marked – 
hundreds of languages are in use in India and least ten of them have currently more than 30 
million speakers each. The Indian nation was therefore composed of multiple nationalities, and 
within each there were further sub-groups. In addition to this, across the India were numerous 
tribal communities whose members made up around 7.5 per cent of the population at 
independence. 
Much of the post-independence Indian political spectrum took shape during the colonial period, 
as the development of India’s national movement or freedom struggle took place in a context 
where the society that was pitted against foreign rule was both diverse and was characterized 
by the operation of varying and even contradictory interests. The transformation of the anti-
colonial struggle into a mass movement had to confront the inequalities and unequal relations 
that characterized Indian society even as the politicization generated by the movement also 
pushed those contradictions to the surface (Desai 2002). The growth of an Indian nationalism 
also involved the awakening of the multiple national sentiments of India’s linguistic groups to 
serve as its foundation. On the other hand, the divisive potential of India’s diversity and of 
revivalism was also ruthlessly stoked and exploited by the British rulers as part of the policy of 
divide et impera – most importantly by the promotion of religious community based conflict 
that eventually resulted in partition accompanying Indian independence. 
An array of political forces from Left to Right and organizations representing different interests 
emerged in this complex background – some more regionally concentrated and others of a 
national nature (Dutt 1983, Sarkar 1983). Communal formations like the Muslim League and 
the Hindu Mahasabha came into being in the early part of the 20th century, and the former 
eventually championed the cause of creating a separate Pakistan. The Justice Party which later 
became the Dravidar Kazhgam (precursor of the Dravidian parties which have continued to 
dominate Tamil Nadu’s politics till date) was also formed in 1917 as a challenge to high-caste 
domination. The Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) came into being by 
1925 – though it stayed away from the national movement and floated its political front, the 
Jan Sangh, only in 1951.  The Communist Party was also founded in the 1920s. It was the Indian 
National Congress though which managed to emerge as the major political expression of 
Indian nationalism. The Congress itself was an umbrella organization that accommodated 
within itself a variety of tendencies (some of whom, like the Congress Socialist Party, were to 
separate from it immediately after independence). It managed to attract support across the 
divides that characterized Indian society. It was also the political formation towards which 
Indian capitalists graduated in the run up to independence (Ray 1985, Markovits 1985). These 
processes, however, ensured that the Congress was at best reformist in relation to the 
iniquities embedded in India’s society, incapable of being the political instrument of any 
radical transformation. This was to make the transformative impact of the transfer of power 
in 1947 on Indian society less significant than it might have been. Yes, independence did mean 
an important discontinuity in the history of Indian capitalist development insofar as it made it 
possible for the state to be now used more effectively than earlier to promote national 
capitalist development. It, however, left largely untouched the socio-economic structure 
inherited from British rule.        
Indian Independence: Continuity and Change 
With the adoption of the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, and the declaration 
of India as a republic on 26 January 1950, the formal structure of rule in independent India was 
put in place. Its key elements were a federal system of government with cabinets and elected 
legislatures at the central and state (province) level, with a division of powers between them. 
This was followed by the linguistic reorganization of states. The constitutional framework of 
Government that came into being had its antecedents in the ‘constitutional reforms’ brought 
about by the erstwhile British rulers. However, emerging as it did in the background of a 
national movement in which diverse classes participated, the constitution of independent 
India did make significant departures from the previous constitutional structure. It severed 
the direct political ties with Britain, and eliminated the many special powers that had been 
exercised by the non-elected bureaucracy. It also extended the electorate to include the 
entire adult population, and replaced the system of representation by ‘classes and interests’ 
with one of territorial representation. The administrative apparatus of Government, the 
police force and the army of independent India were, however, inherited from British rule as 
they were (Bettelheim 1977).  
The equality of all citizens and a secular state were formally enshrined in the Constitution and 
many of the traditional forms of discrimination were outlawed along with the legitimization 
of affirmative action. These, however, existed in an uneasy relationship with the underlying 
realities of Indian society which were yet to be transformed5.  
The institutional framework for capitalist accumulation was also put in place in the years after 
independence (Das Gupta 2016). The intermingling of the worlds of business and politics 
during India’s national movement had already created some of the background and setting 
for the negotiation on and operation of this framework. The actual outcomes, which were 
much more favourable to capital than labour, were indicative of what was to prove to be a 
persistent feature of the Indian state – an extremely weak capacity to discipline private capital 
(Chibber 2004). This only reinforced the tendencies that came instinctively to a capitalist class 
with strong roots in mercantile activity – the reliance on acquisition of technology rather than 
its development and the proclivity to seek and use state patronage not just for collective but 
even individual benefits.  
One of the significant expressions of the conservative nature of Indian capitalism was the 
inability of the post-independence state to reform the agrarian structure in any significant way 
other than eliminating a top layer of rentiers (Patnaik 1986). It allowed itself to be thwarted by 
powerful landed interests who continued to enjoy significant political power. As such, there was 
no substantive undoing of what was called the "built-in- depressor" in India’s agrarian structure 
(Thorner 1956) – the tendency for most of the surplus to concentrate in the hands of a landed 
minority removed from production, producing both iniquity and the maintenance of low 
productivity. Indeed, like the colonial state before it, the state in independent India too kept 
large agrarian incomes outside even the ambit of taxation. Unlike under colonialism, however, 
there were attempts after independence to bring about capitalist development and 
improvements in agriculture through a combination of other measures (e.g. the green 
                                                          
5 B.R. Ambedkar’s speech in the Constituent Assembly in 1949 drew attention to this: “On the 26th of January 
1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and 
economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be recognizing the principle of one man one vote and 
one vote one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, 
continue to deny the principle of one man one value. How long shall we continue to live this life of 
contradictions? How long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? If we continue to 
deny it for long, we will do so only by putting our political democracy in peril. We must remove this contradiction 
at the earliest possible moment or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political 
democracy which is Assembly has to laboriously built up”. 
revolution strategy) (Patnaik 1994, Rao 1994). These did ease the agrarian barrier to capitalist 
industrialization but failed to decisively eliminate it.  
Notwithstanding what was put in the constitution, and in some ways because of some parts 
of it, even independence did not mean the unleashing of any process fundamentally 
undermining caste oppression or that of women. These were not only integral to the agrarian 
structure and the organization of the rural economy which was left undisturbed, the 
operation of an agrarian barrier to industrialization also meant that the opportunities of 
escape from these through class, occupational and location mobility also remained limited. 
These consequences were epitomized by the fact that India remained largely rural and 
agrarian even after independence. Landlessness, however, tended to increase over time even 
as new rural elites emerged out of the state’s attempts at promoting agricultural 
development. The former meant a continuous process of swelling of labour reserves which 
served to maintain a systemic tendency towards maintaining a cheap labour economy 
characterized by informality and casualization – and institutions like caste thrived in this too. 
The coexistence, of the basis for social conservatism and its deep entrenchment, with the 
instabilities and unevenness associated with capitalist development, came to characterize 
Indian reality after independence. 
The Capitalist Class, the State and Indian Democracy under Dirigisme 
As mentioned earlier, an integral feature of capitalism in India has been the substantial 
reliance of private capital, not only collectively but also individually, on state support to its 
development. After independence, the strategy of ‘planned economic development’ under 
conditions of ‘relative autonomy’ provided the overarching framework of such support and 
on the whole received the support of capitalists (Das Gupta 2016). State economic policy was 
to be subsequently marked by periodic changes as a result of frequent adjustments in 
response to, or forced by, contingent circumstances. However, the core of the strategy was 
maintained till the 1980s.  
Import-substituting industrialization did provide a background for a significant development, 
of Indian big business (Mazumdar 2008). Private corporate capital’s relative share in the 
economy did not increase significantly except in the initial years of the period. It also became 
more confined to manufacturing activities as it was squeezed out by the public sector from 
other spheres like banking and finance, mining, transport and communication, electricity, etc. 
As the manufacturing sector became more diversified, however, Indian business groups 
moved from a situation of being confined to a few traditional industries like the textiles into 
others such as steel and steel products, chemicals, cement, automobiles and automobile 
products, industrial and other machinery and consumer electronics. The state supported 
development of the financial system the backward and forward linkages of public investment 
were extremely crucial to this advance of private capital as was the state’s role in the agrarian 
economy.  
The extent and the effectiveness of the state support to industrialization and social 
development were, however, also undermined by the nature of the state-business 
interaction. What has been pejoratively called the “license-permit raj” was in reality the routine 
abuse, manipulation, and circumvention of the system of controls to their advantage by big 
business firms with the assistance of the discretionary decision-makers in the state apparatus. 
This became an entrenched part of business behaviour and the clientelism, corruption and 
cronyism associated with it became more pronounced with time (Goyal 1979, Kochanek 1987, 
Virmani 2004). Private capital also successfully beat the revenue mobilization effort thereby 
limiting the state’s ability to expand public expenditures. 
It would, however, be a bit of a caricature to represent the Indian state before liberalization as 
being entirely captive to powerful private interests. Indeed it was not even the case that a fixed 
and exclusive set of favoured business firms remained the beneficiaries of state patronage 
throughout. This is what created the possibility for new constituents in India’s business elite 
to emerge (Mazumdar 2011). The general setting of an interventionist economic policy regime 
also provided a context for significant autonomous state action. For instance, the period of the 
most intense economic difficulties, from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, also saw the high tide 
of nationalization and government takeovers of many stricken private sector companies.  
What were the implications of the political system of independent India in shaping the 
interaction between the state and the economy, specifically the fact that the State had to 
operate within the framework of representative democracy? A common theme that explicitly 
or implicitly lay behind often very diverse viewpoints is the notion of the constraints on the 
state imposed by democracy. This constraint has been seen, if one were to put it in somewhat 
simple terms, in either limiting the ability of the State to do ‘wrong’, or do ‘right’. Those who 
took the former view were appreciative of the iniquities characterizing the Indian economic and 
social structure and their implications for political power, but stressed the parallel factor of 
legitimation (Chakravarty 1987). The latter commonly expressed itself in the notion of the State 
being unable to pursue any ‘rational’ economic programme because it is constantly subject to 
the pressure of demands from diverse interest-groups and lobbies, demands which it has to 
accommodate given the nature of the political system. Another view that falls somewhere in 
between the previous two but tilts towards the latter is one based on the perception of the 
existence of two twin tendencies, that of ‘political awakening’ and of ‘political decay’ (Manor 
1992).  Political awakening, the increased self-assertion and political participation of a variety 
of social groups, it was argued, led to increased demands on state resources. This, coupled with 
political decay, or the increasing ‘inability of political institutions to respond creatively or 
adequately’ to such self-assertion by different groups, made the country more difficult to 
govern. In the sphere of State economic policy, this was seen as the root cause behind the rise 
of economic populism and the inability to bring about necessary reforms because of the 
operation of vested interests’ (Joshi and Little 1994).  
The so-called political decay was, however, not something that simply happened due to 
exogenous reasons. The underlying socio-economic structure and the constrained dynamics it 
gave rise to shaped also the way the institutions of Indian democracy worked. The structure 
itself was fundamentally incapable of eliminating the conflict of interests and aspirations 
without a transformation even though it induced them to be expressed. It also bears 
remembering that populism or making concessions was not the only way in which the Indian 
State responded to the demands made from it. The very period in which such ‘populism’ grew 
and the idea that the state had to deliver a range of benefits to citizens, particularly the poor, 
took root – when Indira Gandhi came to lead the Congress – also saw the imposition of the 
Emergency (1975-77) which was not simply an attempt to throttle all political opposition but 
also inflicted on the Indian population some of the harshest economic conditions they had 
experienced since independence. Moreover, if the fiscal constraints faced by the state kept the 
expenditures on providing such benefits in check, in the day to day lives of people the state in 
India generally also was far more authoritarian in character than would be obvious from simply 
the frequency of elections or changes of government.  
However, elections did take place and this did mean that governments could change – the 
Emergency and the subsequent elections were the clear sign that the political stranglehold the 
Congress had managed to maintain after independence in the face of recurrent challenges was 
beginning to come undone. Behind this was its increasing inability to manage the contradictions 
and the cleavages of Indian society even while promoting a process of capitalist development. 
By the end of the 1980s this became even more clearly established. In a complex society like 
India’s, the accompaniment of the regionally uneven decline of the Congress was the 
emergence of a more fractured polity whose different strands grew partly independently and 
partially in mutual interaction with each other and ushered in the era of coalition governments. 
The rise of the BJP based on a Hindu consolidation was one expression of this, aided in part by 
the gravitation of traditional and new elites towards it.  Parallelly, however, a narrowly based 
upward mobility also propelled the emergence of political formations with social bases rooted 
in the different segments of middle and lower castes in some parts of the country and of other 
regional formations. Even as these significant shifts in India’s political landscape were taking 
shape, India made its decisive turn towards economic liberalization following the foreign 
exchange crisis of 1991.  
The Neo-Liberal Turn of Indian Capitalism and Right-Wing Politics 
While widespread dissatisfaction with the actual results of post-independence development 
was a fact and underlay the decline of the Congress, there had been no process making for this 
range of discontents to coalesce into a new consensus in favour of liberalization. Indeed, it was 
the minority Indian National Congress government rather than any new political formation, 
which led the initial march into liberalization. In the immediately preceding elections, it was not 
the wave of economic liberalization that was to follow which occupied centre-stage. Instead, 
implementation of the recommendations of the Mandal Commission (caste-based reservation 
or affirmative action) by the previous government and the Ram Janambhoomi - Babri Masjid 
(Temple vs. Mosque) dispute, and then the assassination of the former Prime Minister mid-way 
through the elections, dominated the election related discourse. The changeover in the policy 
regime was as sudden as it was far reaching. It was a top-down process with actors within the 
Indian policy making elite and in international financial institutions initially crafting the policy 
shift (Sengupta 2008).  
The transition to liberalization had very important implications for Indian democracy, 
emaciating it even further (Mazumdar 2012, 2013a and 2013b). Liberalization meant not an 
elimination of the state’s role but a shrinkage in the scope for autonomous state action and 
consequently a greater leverage of private capital over the state.  The ‘retreat of the state’ itself 
required the state to assume a new role, of overseeing that process and the opening up of the 
economy, and of regulating the many sectors in which it ceded its space to private capital.  The 
‘retreat’ was thus a necessarily qualified one which made it as amenable to manipulation by 
private interests as the old control regime was thereby setting the stage for corruption, 
cronyism and clientelism on an even larger scale. In a deeper structural manner, the retreat of 
the state and the opening up of the economy and the attendant fiscal restrictions have made 
the inducement and encouragement of private investment through various incentives the main 
way through which the state seeks to influence the economy’s growth process. Thus every 
phase of upturn in the aggregative economic performance generates a reluctance to do 
anything that might adversely affect the ‘animal spirits’ and the ‘state of confidence’ of the 
private investor. Every downturn generates a tendency for measures to revive these. The 
placing of the private sector in such a privileged position has in turn made the adoption of a 
friendly attitude towards it a part of the general culture of state functioning in India. At the 
same time, large business firms which have established themselves in key sectors have 
increased their clout and thus influence on regulatory policy in them. The state’s ability to 
discipline private capital has consequently been further eroded and a permissive attitude 
towards capitalist lawlessness has also been a perceptible feature of this period. The 
stranglehold of capital over the state has, however, meant that other segments of Indian society 
have found it far more difficult to claim the state’s attention. 
Once initiated, since it also gave rise to a highly polarizing growth process of which a deep 
seated agrarian crisis (Patnaik 2007, Ramakumar 2014) and premature de-industrialization 
(Rodrik 2015) have been important features, the emergence of any subsequent social 
consensus on it was also next to impossible. The pattern of that growth makes it easy to 
understand why Indian big business and sections of the middle class have come to champion 
the liberalization process (Pedersen 2007, Kohli 2009). Outside of these social segments, 
however, liberalization has not proved to be popular for equally understandable reasons. One 
reflection of the popular dissatisfaction with the results of economic policy has been the high 
level of political instability characterizing this period to which reference has been made at the 
beginning. The recurrent changes in government, however, did not disturb the onward march 
of the liberalization process for the structural reasons described earlier – in other words, the 
triumph of right-wing economics was insulated from the vicissitudes of India’s increasingly 
fractious parliamentary democracy. It did, however, present the BJP with its first opportunity 
to lead a coalition government towards the end of the 1990s. 
The BJP’s economic philosophy had even before liberalization been more right-wing and pro-
private enterprise than was the norm in Indian politics. As such, as the leading component of 
the National Democratic Alliance Government between 1998 and 2004, it had no difficulty in 
identifying identified itself with the liberalization agenda even more strongly than previous 
governments. The culmination of this was the ‘India Shining’ campaign in 20046. The election 
results that followed surprised media commentators as it went against what opinion polls had 
generally projected.  
The decisive rejection of the BJP’s slogan in 2004 and the further slide the party experienced 
in 2009 appeared to mark an important shift in Indian politics by bringing some attention back 
to India’s poor. The reason for this appearance lay in the new discourse and specific policy 
measures initiated by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Congress after 2004 – 
prompted in part by what was the near consensus reading of the 2004 result and by the fact 
that the UPA government was reliant on the outside support of the Left as it did not have a 
parliamentary majority on its own. Apart from slogans like ‘Inclusive Growth’ the introduction 
of measures like a National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGA) during its first 
term were seen as symptomatic of the shift. These were also credited with ensuring the UPA’s 
re-election in 2009 by which time the Left had parted ways with it. Towards the end of its 
second term the UPA also legislated a Food Security Act. Despite these, however, the UPA 
and the Congress was unable to stave of the sharp decline in its popular support in the 2014 
elections.   
While 2004 and 2014 appeared to bring about significant political changes, neither truly 
produced any decisive change in the economic policy paradigm of the Indian state. Instead 
there was a marked continuity. A key indicator of this has been the adherence of both the BJP 
                                                          
6 This was an advertising campaign in the run up to the general elections. It backfired because it projected an 
image of India that was in sharp contrast to the lived reality of a large number of Indians.  
as well as the Congress to fiscal conservatism. The UPA 1 Government in fact notified the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act passed by its predecessor NDA 
Government. What changed was different between the two points of time separated by a 
decade was that while the UPA came to power in 2004 just as Indian economy had moved into 
a phase of extremely rapid growth, the 2014 elections took place in a background of the crisis 
of the neo-liberal growth trajectory having already deeply set in.  
Throughout its ten-year rule, the UPA kept the Central Government Expenditure to GDP ratio 
below the level at the end of the previous government’s term and the fiscal deficit-GDP ratio 
was consistently brought down till 2007-08. However, revenues did swell mainly because 
corporate taxes and income-taxes grew with the result that the tax-GDP ratio improved. 
Underlying this improvement was the fact that profits grew rapidly while wages stagnated and 
inequality increased. The growth in revenues, however, made it possible for public expenditure 
growth to be also eventually stepped up without compromising the objective of keeping the 
fiscal deficit within bounds. This expenditure growth persisted for a while after the eruption of 
the global crisis as the Indian government too had its own version of a fiscal stimulus but this 
was accompanied by a significant fall in the tax-GDP ratio. The consequent rise in the fiscal 
deficit induced a retreat to fiscal consolidation and austerity by the time the second decade of 
the current century began. At the same time, there were clear signs that the Indian economy’s 
growth was slowing down. The slowdown since has been most acute in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors and been accompanied by a stagnation in investment.  
The fiscal consolidation which marked the last three years of the UPA-2 Government prioritized 
curbing of government expenditure over tax mobilisation resulting in a stagnation of real public 
expenditure. This aggravated the growth and investment slowdown which in turn intensified 
the revenue constraints. The expenditure heads that bore the brunt of the austerity measures 
were: agriculture and rural development; fertilizer and food subsidies; and social services (like 
health and education). The expenditure on rural development (which includes the MGNREGA) 
was even in nominal terms lower in the years thereafter than in 2008-09! This is the background 
in which the UPA’s ‘Inclusive growth’ slogan failed to cut, not surprisingly, much ice with the 
electorate in 2014 and it suffered a massive defeat. A series of corruption scandals only added 
to popular discontent.  
The success of the Narendra Modi-led BJP in the 2014 was also made possible because it was 
the political agent of not change but of a reassertion by India’s economic elite. The economic 
crisis created a situation where those on both sides of the process of increasing economic 
divergence were dissatisfied with the UPA but for different reasons. Corporate interests were 
increasingly desperate for a return to the days of rapid profit growth and from their perspective 
this required government capable of taking decisive measures to carry forward the liberal 
reforms agenda even if it meant administering the ‘bitter pill’. A more authoritarian regime than 
what the Congress had been able to be, or was capable of delivering, was thus desirable from 
their point of view.  The near unanimous support that the Modi led-BJP consequently received 
from Indian big business and sections of the middle class tied to the corporate sector was no 
doubt an important factor in shaping the electoral verdict. Its result was a command over 
financial resources and media projection that no other formation was able to match. This was 
of course not sufficient to win the election even with the first past the post system, but the 
support of the business elite helped the BJP in expanding its appeal by tapping more 
successfully than others the discontent that existed in the larger populace.  
The Narendra Modi led-BJP’s electoral success has, however, placed before it the same 
challenge that undid the Congress – namely, managing the myriad contradictory interests even 
as it facilitates a process of capitalist accumulation. This challenge has been made even more 
daunting by the context of the crisis and the fact that the BJP’s political influence is still far from 
being all encompassing. Indeed, those contradictions and the politics they have given rise to 
over time itself constitutes a barrier to the expansion of the BJP’s popular support. 
Substantively on the economic front little has changed in the two and a half years of the Modi-
government. There is an increase in the level of aggressiveness with which neo-liberal policies 
are being pursued but this has not produced any dramatic revival – to that extent the 
aspirations of all the constituents of its support base, including India’s capitalists, have 
remained unsatisfied. On the other hand, pushing this agenda beyond a point requires a 
significant adjustment of the extant social equilibrium that has not been easy to politically 
achieve. No doubt there are recurrent efforts towards this end and some such efforts betray a 
combination of authoritarian tendencies and an element of desperation – the recent 
demonetization decision whereby 86 per cent of the currency was suddenly put out of 
circulation is an example. On the other hand, there are new and unanticipated signs of the social 
equilibrium coming under increasing strain, namely the movements launched by large and 
relatively dominant caste groups in different states like the Patidars of Gujarat, the Jats of 
Haryana and the Marathas of Maharashtra in response to a perceived decline in their economic 
and social status. While increasing authoritarianism in one form or the other and the even 
greater effective erosion of India’s democracy is taking place, it is far from certain that this has 
already secured the current regime’s grip on power and enhanced the chances of its survival 
beyond the next elections.    
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Selected Indicators of Voting Trends in Indian Elections 
Year => 1951 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 
Voter Turnout (%) 44.87 45.44 55.42 61.04 55.27 60.49 56.92 63.56 
Total Seats 489 494 494 520 518 542 542 514 
INC 
Seats Won 364 371 361 283 352 154 353 404 
Vote Share 44.99 47.78 44.72 40.78 43.68 34.52 42.69 49.1 
BJS/BJP 
Seats Won 3 4 14 35 22  31* 2 
Vote Share 3.06 5.97 6.44 9.31 7.35  18.97* 7.74 
Other 
National Party 
Seats Won 12 19 18 44 16 295 41 10 
Vote Share 10.59 10.41 7.89 8.67 10.43 41.32 9.39 6.89 
Party Name Socialist Praja Socialist Swatantra Swatantra Congress (O) Bharatiya Lok Dal JNP (Secular) JNP 
Year => 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014 
Voter Turnout (%) 61.95 56.73 57.94 61.97 59.99 58.07 58.21 66.44 
Total Seats 529 521 543 543 543 543 543 543 
INC 
Seats Won 197 232 140 141 114 145 206 44 
Vote Share 39.53 36.26 28.8 25.82 28.3 26.53 28.55 19.52 
BJS/BJP 
Seats Won 85 120 161 182 182 138 116 282 
Vote Share 11.36 20.11 20.29 25.59 23.75 22.16 18.8 31.34 
Other 
National Party 
Seats Won 143 59 46 32 33 43 21 0 
Vote Share 17.79 11.84 8.08 5.16 5.4 5.66 6.17 4.19 
Party Name Janata Dal Janata Dal Janata Dal CPM CPM CPM BSP BSP 
INC = Indian National Congress; BJS/BJP = Bharatiya Jan Sangh/Bharatiya Janata Party; JNP = Janata Party; CPM = Communist Party of India (Marxist) and BSP = Bahujan 
Samaj Party 
  Indicates Winning Party 
1977 BJS was one of the constituents of the Janata Party (BLD) - which also included the Socialist parties and the Congress (O). 
*1980 BJS was still one of the constituents of the Janata Party but which had by then split. 
1989 The Janata Dal formed the government with the outside support of the BJP and the Left. 
1996 Eventually the United Front coalition of non-Congress and non-BJP parties formed the government with outside support of the Congress.  
1998, 1999, 
2014 BJP was the leading constituent of the National Democratic Alliance coalition government. 
2004, 2009 INC was the leading constituent of the United Progressive Alliance coalition government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
